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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2016 presidential election has led to a great deal of uncertainty 
about future United States policies and practices, particularly for those who 
work in the field of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) or International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), as it is alternatively called.1  In particular, the 
future of the Department of Defense detention facility at Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Station (Guantanamo) raises questions since many of the existing 
                                                 
* Andrea Harrison is the Deputy Legal Advisor for the International Committee of the Red 
Cross’s Regional Delegation for the United States and Canada. She also serves on the Board of 
Directors for the American Branch of the International Law Association.  Andrea is currently pursuing a 
PhD in Law at the University of Leicester.  The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC. 
1. What is International Humanitarian Law?, ICRC (July 1, 2004), https://www.icrc.org/e 
ng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf.  The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) are two names for the same body of law, which includes the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977.   
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processes and conditions were established as a matter of policy, rather than 
law, and therefore could potentially be scrapped on a whim.2  One very 
important example of this, and the subject matter of this paper, is that 
Guantanamo detainees are currently entitled to periodic reviews on the 
necessity of their continued detention by the United States.3  Reviews of the 
necessity of detention are explicitly foreseen by IHL, but the rules for 
detainees captured in relation to a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) 
are unclear.4  At least as a matter of policy, the United States has always 
provided reviews to NIAC detainees, but each iteration has been quite 
different.5   
 The so-called “Periodic Review Boards” (PRBs) are the latest iteration 
of review processes provided to the detainees in Guantanamo.6  Through 
this process, detainees deemed not to pose a significant threat to United 
States security are placed on a transferable list at which point the State 
Department searches for repatriation or resettlement options.7  The 
Executive Order issued by President Trump on January 30th, 2018, 
confirmed the continuation of the PRBs for current Guantanamo detainees 
and extended them to any potential new arrivals.8  In this author’s view, 
PRBs are the most transparent and consistent with international legal 
principles in comparison to previous review processes, but serious flaws 
remain and should be addressed, including issues related to independence, 
impartiality and the protection against self-incrimination.  Should these 
flaws be directly addressed, the PRBs could provide an efficient and 
meaningful way of ensuring detainees are not held any longer than is 
absolutely necessary (i.e., only as long as such individuals pose an 
imperative threat to security).  These processes are not a substitute for 
continued access to the courts through the writ of habeas corpus, but as 
habeas has been ruled not to apply in similar cases to battlefield zones like 
                                                 
2. Here the author does not refer to minimum conditions to meet humane treatment standards 
under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or other legal standards that may apply, 
but rather other policies as review processes or transfers from Guantanamo. 
3. Periodic Review Secretariat, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.prs.mil/ (last visited Jan. 29, 
2018) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.]. 
4. Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict:  The ICRC's Work on Strengthening 
Legal Protection, ICRC (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/other-activities/develop 
ment-ihl/strengthening-legal-protection-ihl-detention.htm. 
5. Here one refers to the Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan or the Administrative 
Review Boards in Guantanamo, amongst others. 
6. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 3. 
7. Id. 
8. See Exec. Order No. 13780, 3 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
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Afghanistan or Iraq,9 and habeas can require many years of litigation 
including appeals, PRBs should be seen as a necessary parallel track for 
law-of-war detainees who may not be subject to any criminal proceedings.10 
 Most detainees at Guantanamo were picked up during the conflict in 
Afghanistan,11 but the applicable law remains less than clear.  Periodic 
reviews are set out under the law of international armed conflict (IAC), but 
they are not explicitly mentioned in the (sparse) treaty law governing 
NIAC.12  An IAC exists wherever there is a resort to force between two or 
more states, and an NIAC exists where there is “protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups . . . .”13  While not without controversy, the United States 
considers that all persons held in Guantanamo are held in relation to an 
NIAC.14 
 The distinction between IAC and NIAC is key because while detained 
persons in an IAC have a specific legal status with detailed legal 
protections, NIAC rules do not create any kind of special legal status for 
detainees and are generally vague or silent on procedural guarantees.15  The 
need for detention during armed conflict is generally not debated, as 
detention is viewed as a preferable option than to killing the enemy, 
especially if there is no manifest military necessity to do so.16  Nonetheless, 
                                                 
9. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
10. Guantanamo Bay Periodic Review Board (PRB) Project:  Administrative Detention Rights 
& Interests of Detainees without Being Charged, THE GITMO OBSERVER, https://gitmoobserver.com/pr 
bs/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018). 
11. Jackie Northam, Q&A About Guantanamo Bay and the Detainees, NPR (June 23, 2005, 
12:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4715916.  A significant minority 
were “rendered” from other countries and held elsewhere before arriving in Guantanamo.  See generally 
S. Rep. No. 113–288, at 187 (2014). 
12. See Fact Sheet:  New Actions on Guantanamo and Detainee Policy, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(Mar. 7, 2011), https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2011/03/Fact_ 
Sheet_-_Guantanamo_and_Detainee_Policy.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE, Fact Sheet]. 
13. See Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, art. 2, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T., 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (it applies to any armed conflict, whether it is 
international or non-international) [hereinafter GC IV]; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94010I, 
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
14. Chris Jenks, A Matter of Policy:  United States Application of the Law of Armed Conflict, 
46 SW. L. REV. 337, 337–39 (2017). 
15. Id. at 337, 342, 348. 
16. See Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 No. 3 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 819, 819 (2013). 
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any deprivation of liberty is a serious affront to personal liberties and must 
be carefully regulated.17 
There are several factors that make initial detention quite chaotic on a 
battlefield—particularly in NIAC and especially when the conflict takes 
place outside of the territories of one of the parties.18  If it is an 
extraterritorial NIAC, one can imagine there will be language and cultural 
barriers present that make it very difficult for the capturing soldier to 
identify the status or intent of the captured person.19  In many contexts, one 
or more of the parties will not be in a uniform and thus in the heat of battle, 
it will be next to impossible for the capturing soldiers to know whether they 
have captured a civilian who just happened to be holding a gun for self-
defense, a civilian who was directly participating in hostilities, or a member 
of an organized armed group.20  A capturing soldier may simply be unable 
to make such determinations.  These differences all significantly impact the 
legality and duration of an individual’s detention.21  
States agreed to detention review mechanisms particularly because of 
the difficulties of battlefield detention.22  The emphasis was put on initial 
reviews, as these were intended to help with the status identification of 
persons in an IAC (i.e. civilians v.  combatants), but states also recognized 
the need for periodic reviews, at least for civilians, to protect against 
abuses.23  However, states were far less eager to accept such limitations of 
NIACs and to have the international community involved in sovereign 
internal affairs—even though the need for detention and detention reviews 
                                                 
17. Ryan Goodman, Authorization versus Regulation of Detention in Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 155, 159 (2015) [hereinafter Authorization vs. Regulation]. 
18. Noam Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS, 737, 749 (2005). 
19. Id. at 746, 749. 
20. See, e.g., id. at 737, 749.   
While the dividing line between combatant and civilian might not always be one hundred percent 
clear in international armed conflicts, it is a distinction that can be maintained at most times.  Not so is 
the situation in non-international armed conflicts, in which this distinction is not as readily visible, 
neither on the ground nor in the law.  Id. at 749. 
21. Id. at 753–54. 
22. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 5, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, construed in Jean S. Pictet, Commentary:  III Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 73 (1960) [hereinafter Pictet, Commentary 
III]. 
23. See, e.g., id. art. 5, 77. 
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are similar to an IAC.24  In fact, this need in NIAC is probably far greater 
because there is no “status” in NIACs and thus the military necessity to 
detain becomes solely about conduct and whether an individual poses a 
threat.25 
 Some basic legal requirements should prevent NIAC detention from 
becoming arbitrary in nature.  This should include: 
i)   the right to challenge one’s detention before a court, at 
least on an initial basis (i.e. habeas corpus), 
ii)   obligatory, automatic and periodic reviews, 
iii)   by an independent and impartial board with the final say 
in continued detention or release.26 
Much of the debate on detention during NIAC centers on whether such 
detention is even authorized by IHL and/or international human rights law 
(IHRL).  Regardless of the legality of NIAC detention, it takes place in 
numerous contexts around the world.  In light of the reality—if not the 
legality—of NIAC detention, it is essential to determine if and to what 
extent these detainees may challenge their detention, and if so, when and 
how they may do so.27 
                                                 
24. Anna Nelson, Contemporary IHL Challenges:  Use of Force and Non-Intentional Armed 
Conflicts, INTERCROSS BLOG (Jan. 2, 2014), http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/contemporary-ihlchall 
enges-use-of-force-and-non-international-armed-conflicts. 
25. Unfortunately, as Professor Laurie Blank has stated, “[n]either conventional nor 
customary law relating to armed conflicts includes any statement regarding the procedural requirements 
for detention in non-international armed conflict, particularly administrative detention akin to that 
contemplated in the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I.”  See Laurie R. Blank, 
Complex Legal Frameworks and Complex Operational Challenges:  Navigating the Applicable Law 
Across the Continuum of Military Operations, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 87, 104 (2012). 
26. Most scholars would also argue that effective assistance of counsel is also necessary to 
prevent arbitrary detention during armed conflict, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.  See 
Internment in Armed Conflict:  Basic Rules and Challenges, ICRC, 3, 5, 9 (Nov. 25, 2014), https:// 
www.icrc.org/en/document/internment-armed-conflict-basic-rules-and-challenges [hereinafter ICRC, 
Internment in Armed Conflict]. 
27. For those situations which actually amount to armed conflict and thus are governed at  
least in part by IHL, there are extensive academic and political debates about the appropriate legal 
framework and legal classification of detained persons.  See, e.g., James Schoettler, Detention of 
Combatants and the Global War on Terror, in 67 THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR:  A 
MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 131 (Geoffrey S. Corn et al. eds., 2d ed., 2015); Gregory Rose, Preventive 
Detention of Individuals Engaged in Transnational Hostilities:  Do We Need a Fourth Protocol 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions?, NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS:  CRITICAL DEBATES ON 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 45–63 (William C. Banks ed., 2011); Peter Vedel Kessing, Security Detention 
in UN Peace Operations, in SEARCHING FOR A “PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY” IN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 272–303 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012); Tatyana Eatwell, Selling the Pass:  
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 The central argument of this article relies on the fact that detention 
will take place during armed conflict, regardless of whether such detention 
is “lawful” or not, and thus it is better to regulate such detention than to 
pretend that it does not happen.  This article is not meant to advocate for, or 
justify the use of, security detention where it is not otherwise permissible, 
but rather focuses on the ways in which detainees may challenge their 
detention, regardless of its legality.28  When parties to NIAC detain 
someone, the procedural guarantees should be clear and established in 
accordance with international (and/or domestic) law.  IHL requires that 
persons be released as soon as the reasons necessitating their detention no 
longer exist, but this can only be done if appropriate detention review 
procedures are put in place.29  The questions this article seeks to address is 
whether periodic reviews of detention in a NIAC are required, whether 
Periodic Review Boards meet the minimum legal requirements under 
international law, and whether they should be perpetuated by this United 
States administration. 
 Part II covers the existing international legal rules regarding periodic 
review of security detention in relation to armed conflict, looking at the law 
                                                 
Habeas Corpus, Diplomatic Relations and the Protection of Liberty and Security of Persons Detained 
Abroad, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 727, 727–39 (2013); Oona Hathaway et al., The Power to Detain:  
Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 124, 124–77 (2013); Goodman, supra 
note 16, at 819–53; Diane Webber, Preventive Detention in the Law of Armed Conflict:  Throwing Away 
the Key?, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 167, 167–205 (2012); Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, The Role of 
Necessity in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, 47 ISR. L. REV. 225 (2014); Deborah 
N. Pearlstein, How Wartime Detention Ends, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 625, 625–65 (2014); Ashley E. 
Siegel, Some Holds Barred:  Extending Executive Detention Habeas Law Beyond Guantanamo Bay, 92 
BOS. UNIV. L. REV. 1405, 1405–30 (2012); Laurie R. Blank, Square Peg in a Round Hole:  Stretching 
Law of War Detention Too Far, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1169, 1169–93 (2011); Knut Dörmann, Detention 
in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 347, 347–66 (2012); William K. Lietzau, 
Detention of Terrorists in the Twenty-First Century, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 323, 323–45 (2012). 
28. In other words, this paper is setting aside the fact that parties may engage in security 
detention operations without an appropriate international or domestic legal basis or have chosen to base 
detention on a LOAC framework when it would be more appropriate to use a criminal law framework.  
Instead, this paper focuses solely on the procedural guarantees that should be in place when detention is 
carried out in relation to an (alleged) armed conflict, without taking a position on the validity of that 
detention as such. 
29. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 132, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 
construed in Jean S. Pictet, Commentary:  IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, 510 (1958) [hereinafter Pictet, Commentary IV]; see International Committee 
of the Red Cross [ICRC], Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Part V, § II, art. 85(4)(b) (1977) [hereinafter 
ICRC Protocol]; International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study, Part V, ch. 37, Rule 128. [hereinafter ICRC CIHL Study]. 
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of armed conflict, international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law.  Part III analyzes existing United States law and policy with 
respect to periodic reviews of security detention in relation to armed 
conflict.  Part IV addresses the structure and appropriateness of PRBs for 
current and future Guantanamo detainees.  Finally, Part V considers how 
PRBs comport with IHL and makes recommendations regarding the 
existing PRB process and any security detention review processes that the 
United States may consider establishing for future non-international armed 
conflicts in which it may become involved. 
II. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW ON PERIODIC REVIEW 
OF SECURITY DETENTION IN ARMED CONFLICT 
 This part sets out the legal provisions and the practical reasons for the 
existence of periodic reviews of detention in relation to armed conflict, 
during both IACs and NIACs.  During IACs civilian internees and certain 
combatants (e.g. wounded and sick) may be entitled to periodic reviews of 
detention, but the lack of black letter law in NIACs requires reliance on 
either customary IHL—which is unclear on the matter—or IHRL—which 
seems to have certain requirements that may be impossible during 
battlefield detention and which does not provide for automatic periodic 
reviews.30  The purpose of Part II is to show the current state of 
international law—both treaty and customary—and identify where the gaps 
exists with respect to detention reviews in NIAC.   
 Periodic Reviews of Internment in International Armed Conflicts 
 IHL and IHRL both provide a right to challenge one’s detention, and 
there are very particular reasons why all detainees in any armed conflict 
should have a mechanism to challenge their detention during an armed 
conflict.31  
1. Status in IACs 
 In order to understand the different review mechanisms in IAC, it is 
necessary to understand the different status categories found under IHL.  
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 established two main categories of 
persons or “statuses”:  combatants and civilians—neither term was 
                                                 
30. See, e.g., ICRC CIHL Study, supra note 29, at Part V, ch. 32, Rule 99. 
31. See ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at § I, art. 73(3). 
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defined.32  However, captured combatants were referred to as “prisoners of 
war” (POW) and this term was clearly defined.33  Under Article 4 (1) of the 
Third Geneva Convention of 1949, “prisoners of war” are defined as 
“[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as 
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces . . 
. .”34  The term “civilians” was not defined until the adoption of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I (AP I), where it was simply defined in the negative—
i.e. everyone who is not a combatant (or another defined status) is a 
civilian.35  The definition of combatants and civilians is largely 
uncontroversial, except in the United States, which generally accepts these 
two categories, but has defended a third status (in both IACs and NIACs) 
called an unprivileged enemy belligerent.36 
 There is one provision that applies to all people detained in an IAC 
regardless of whether an individual meets the criteria of to be protected 
under one of the Geneva Conventions or AP I (a “protected person”) and 
thus entitled to a full panoply of protections—Article 75(3) requires that: 
                                                 
32. GC IV, supra note 13, at art. 4(1); see also ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at § II, art. 43, 
50. 
33. ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at § II, art. 44. 
34. GC III, supra note 29, at art. 4(1).  There are also certain categories of “non-combatants” 
who accompany the armed forces and thus may be entitled to prisoner of war status under Article 4 of 
GC III.  Id. at art. 4(2)–(6).  In 1977, Additional Protocol I (AP I) expanded the definition of combatant 
to include individuals who carry weapons openly “a) during each military engagement” and “b) during 
such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the 
launching of an attack in which he is to participate.”  ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at § III, art. 44(3). 
35. The exact wording of Article 50 of AP I states that a “civilian is any person who does not 
belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third 
Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol.  In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that 
person shall be considered to be a civilian.”  ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at art. 50(1). 
36. The term “unlawful enemy combatant” has also been used.  The term “unprivileged 
enemy belligerent” has been defined in a variety of materials, including in § 948a (7) of the 2009 
Military Commissions Act, where the term was defined as an individual who “(A) has engaged in 
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; (B) has purposefully and materially 
supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; or (C) was a part of al Qaeda at 
the time of the alleged offense under this chapter.”  10 U.S.C. § 948(a)(7) (2009). 
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Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to 
the armed conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he 
understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken.  
Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such 
persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in 
any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, 
detention or internment have ceased to exist.37 
AP I does not reference detention review boards, but confirms the already 
existing rules of the four Geneva Conventions.38  While not all states are a 
party to AP I, Article 75 is considered customary IHL binding on all parties 
during an IAC.39 
2. Initial Review Mechanisms in IACs 
 While an IAC presumes that most fighters will be members of a state’s 
armed forces—fully recognizable by their uniforms and other indicators 
such as ID tags—Article 5 of Geneva Convention III (GC III) explicitly 
provides a review mechanism for any person who has “committed a 
belligerent act” but where doubt remains as to whether the person is entitled 
to POW status.40  While there is a presumption of POW status in such IAC 
cases, if there is a doubt as to the person’s status, they must “enjoy the 
protection of the [Third] Convention until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal.”41   
 While some states did not accept the proposal for a court during the 
drafting negotiations, the term “competent tribunal” was used in Article 5 to 
prevent a single person from being the sole arbiter for determining an 
                                                 
37. ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at § IV, art. 75(3). 
38. Id. at § III, art. 75. 
39. President Obama, for example, declared this article to be binding on the United States as 
customary international law.  WHITE HOUSE, Fact Sheet, supra note 12.  As a reminder, customary law 
is formed when there is created by looking at state practice and opinion juris (i.e. a sense of legal 
obligation).  André da Rocha Ferreira et. al., Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, 
UFRGSMUN | UFRGS MODEL U.N. J. 182, 183 (2013). 
40. GC III, supra note 29, at art. 5. 
41. Pictet, Commentary III, supra note 22, at art. 5, 77.  This would appear quite 
straightforward, but in fact, the notion of what constitutes a “competent tribunal” for initial review was a 
matter of great debate at the diplomatic conference for drafting the Geneva Conventions.  According to 
Jean Pictet, who was present during the drafting and negotiation of the 1949 Conventions, there was 
some debate over whether the term “responsible authority” or “military tribunal” would be more 
appropriate.  Some at the diplomatic conference thought that such a serious decision should “not be left 
to a single person” but should be decided by a court.  Id. 
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individual’s status.42  States have implemented this provision in a number 
of ways, but general practice suggests that an Article 5 Tribunal consists of 
a certain number of commissioned officers (typically three to five), which 
may include a military lawyer or judge.43  The initial review carried out in 
cases of doubt by an Article 5 Tribunal is particularly significant as POWs 
are also not entitled to periodic reviews of their detention, although they 
must “be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active 
hostilities.”44  
 Unlike combatants, civilians may only be interned in an IAC “if the 
security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary”45 and are 
provided an opportunity to challenge the necessity of any deprivation 
before a court or an administrative board.46  Article 43 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention (GC IV) states that, “[a]ny protected person who has 
been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such 
action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or 
administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.”47  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentaries to 
GC IV emphasize that the main protection for civilian internees is that they 
“should be absolutely free to make their appeals and that the authorities 
should examine them with absolute objectivity and impartiality.”48   
                                                 
42. Id. at art. 5, par. 2. 
43. David Turns et. al., Classification, Administration, and Treatment of Battlefield Detainees, 
in COUNTERTERRORISM:  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 426, 448–51 (Ana Maria Salinas de 
Frias et. al. eds., 2012).  For more information on state practice in this area, see generally id. 
44. GC III, supra note 29, at art. 118.  In addition to the Article 5 tribunals, GC III provides 
for Mixed Medical Commissions (MMCs) to determine whether wounded or sick POWs must be 
repatriated or held in a neutral country for health reasons.  Id. at art.112.  The types of wounded and sick 
POWs that qualify are listed in Article 110 of GC III, but generally those that must be repatriated are 
those with the most serious cases of mental or physical suffering, and those who may be accommodated 
in a neutral country are those whose condition requires accommodation outside of the context of 
captivity to ensure a “more certain and speedy recovery.”  Id. at art.110.  Article 112 sets out the 
requirement for an MMC to review these cases, but the composition and procedures are laid out in far 
greater detail in Annex II to GC III.  Art. 1 of Annex II requires that the “Mixed Medical Commissions 
provided for in Article 112 of the Convention shall be composed of three members, two of whom shall 
belong to a neutral country, the third being appointed by the Detaining Power.”  Id. at Annex II, art. 1.  
Article 6 of Annex II recommends that the two neutral members be medical professionals, namely a 
surgeon and a general practitioner.  Id. at Annex II, art. 6.  In addition to the composition of MMCs, the 
regulations are clear that these bodies must be set up immediately “upon the outbreak of hostilities.”  
GC III, supra note 29, at art. 112.  This is to ensure that they are functioning before the wounded and 
sick begin to arrive to POW camps or hospitals.  Id. 
45. GC IV, supra note 13, at art. 42. 
46. Id.  
47. Id. at art. 43. 
48. Pictet, Commentary IV, supra note 29, at art. 43. 
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 Like Article 5 tribunals for POWs, the initial review for civilians 
interned in an IAC is not automatic.49  As with Article 5 tribunals, the state 
may choose whether to permit access to either a regular court or an 
administrative board, which must offer “the necessary guarantees of 
independence and impartiality” and be comprised of more than one 
official.50  If a civilian internee challenges their internment, “the court or 
administrative board must examine it at the earliest possible moment.”51  
However, there is no further mention of procedure in Article 43 of GC IV 
with respect to how the initial review should be conducted, and thus the 
composition and procedures are largely left to states to determine.52  
Civilians may also be interned in occupied territory53 under procedures 
essentially identical to Article 43 of GC IV.54   
3. Periodic Review Mechanisms in IACs 
 Since POWs are not entitled to any kind of periodic review under IHL, 
periodic reviews only exist for civilian internees under GC IV.55  Both 
Article 43 of GC IV and Article 78 of GC IV require periodic reviews of 
internment, which are automatic “appeals” of the initial determination of 
internment.56  While the civilian internee must proactively seek the initial 
review, he or she is entitled to automatic, regular reviews if the initial 
challenge failed.57  Periodic reviews are, thus, only available to civilian 
internees that have initially challenged their detention.58 
                                                 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army.  The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established 
and can be exercised.”  Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, Oct. 18, 
1907, 187 CTS 227; Tristan Ferraro, Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under 
International Humanitarian Law, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 133, 133–34 (2012). 
54. Article 78 of the GC IV refers to a “regular procedure” that must be “in accordance with 
the provisions of the present Convention.”  GC IV, supra note 13, at art. 78. 
55. The Mixed Medical Commissions are supposed to visit the POW camps periodically, 
generally every six months, but it is not clear whether they are required to review only new cases or to 
also re-examine old cases.  Pictet, Commentary III, supra note 22, at art. 112, 527; see also ICRC, 
Internment in Armed Conflict, supra note 26 at 5. 
56. GC IV, supra note 13, at art. 43, 78. 
57. Pictet, Commentary IV, supra note 29, at art. 43. 
58. The initial review could in theory be made by the same administrative board, or by a 
judicial body, depending on the setup of the domestic system.  Id. 
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 Under Article 43, an administrative board should reconsider cases “at 
least twice yearly” due to the rapid “progress of events” likely to occur 
during wartime.59  In theory this could be the same board that made the 
initial decision to intern.  The provision adds that the Board should look 
“favorably” at the appeal but does not give any information on a particular 
burden of proof or other indication of how the review should be 
conducted.60  Furthermore, the Pictet Commentary only suggests that it 
would be an “advantage . . . if States Party to the Convention afford better 
safeguards (examination of cases at more frequent intervals, or the setting 
up of a higher appeal court).”61 
 The provision for periodic reviews under Article 78 of GC IV is 
essentially the same, except that instead of requiring a review “at least 
twice yearly”, it only requires review “if possible every six months.”62  This 
seems to suggest that states wanted to give themselves a bit more flexibility 
in occupied territories, so that even if periodic reviews are still mandatory, 
their frequency is flexible enough to take into account the exigencies of 
governing what may be hostile territory.  The drafters clearly recognized 
the obvious difference between setting up detainee reviews in a state’s own 
territory and setting up detainee reviews when occupying a foreign 
territory.63  Rule 99 of the ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian 
Law Study (CIHL) reaffirms compulsory periodic reviews of detention for 
civilian internees in an IAC, but does not add further detail to the text and 
commentaries of Articles 43 and 78.64 
 In summary, initial reviews are available to all types of detainees held 
in relation to an IAC, but only civilian internees enjoy periodic reviews.65  
The importance of this distinction is most apparent when discussing 
periodic reviews in NIAC and considering what types of review 
mechanisms should be available to those detainees, when compared to an 
IAC.  In other words, should NIAC detainees only be permitted to make an 
initial habeas challenge, akin to the initial Article 5 challenge of a POW, or 
should they be entitled to periodic review of their detention as civilians in 
the model of GC IV? 
                                                 
59. Id.  
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Pictet, Commentary IV, supra note 29, at art. 78. 
63. ICRC REP. 27-10-1998, GENERAL PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE FOURTH GENEVA 
CONVENTION, at 1(a) (1998) [hereinafter ICRC, Geneva]. 
64. ICRC Customary IHL (CIHL), Rule 99.  Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty is Prohibited-
International Armed Conflicts, Procedural Requirements, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/custo 
mary-ihl/eng/docs/vi_rul_rule99 (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) [hereinafter ICRC, CIHL]. 
65. ICRC, Geneva, supra note 63, at 6(a). 
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4. Independence and Impartiality 
 In addition to mandating the availability of detention review boards in 
IAC, GC IV also makes it clear that these boards must be independent and 
impartial, but the treaty does not go any further in defining these principles 
in the context of an armed conflict.66  The concepts of independence and 
impartiality have been thoroughly addressed in relation to fair trial rights 
under a human rights framework, but less so in the context of 
administrative processes, and hardly at all in relation to administrative 
processes under IHL.  While all regional human rights treaties mandate that 
that courts must be both impartial and independent, the exact meaning of 
these terms is not defined.67  Thus, it is necessary to look at various 
interpretations of these treaties, such as United Nation soft law or 
international jurisprudence, to have a better understanding of how these 
terms may be applied by the judiciary.  
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
provides in article 14(1) that “all persons shall be equal before the courts 
and tribunals” and that “in the determination of any criminal charge against 
him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit of law, everyone shall be 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.”68  What exactly is meant by 
“independence” and “impartiality” and can these concepts be faithfully 
applied in a battlefield setting? 
 The principle of judicial independence is an objective concept, and 
thus is based on objective criteria.69  While there is much domestic case law 
on this issue, in light of the thesis’s focus on international law, it is best to 
begin with the United Nation’s Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary.70  The Basic Principles set out a number of different important 
elements, but there a few key principles that will be of the most use in 
                                                 
66. ICRC, CIHL, supra note 64. 
67. Id. 
68. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].  The United States ratified the treaty 
Sept. 8, 1992.  Id.  Other regional human rights treaties provide a similar rule.  See also, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(1), 2200A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, O.H.C.H.R. (entered 
into force on Mar. 23, 1976); see also, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 7(1), June 
27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982) (entered into force on Oct. 21, 1986); 
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(1) July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
69. See Basic Principles of Independence of the Judiciary, Seventh United Nations Congress 
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 Aug. to 6 Sep. 1985, U.N. 
Doc.A/Conf.121/22/Rev.1, 60. [hereinafter Basic Principles]. 
70. Id. at 59. 
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discussing independence as applied to periodic review boards during 
NIACs.71 
 Basic Principle 1 states “[t]he independence of the judiciary shall be 
guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the 
country . . . [i]t is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to 
respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.”72  Basic Principle 3 
states “[t]he judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial 
nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue 
submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law.”73  
Basic Principle 4 prohibits “inappropriate or unwarranted interference with 
the judicial process[.]”74  Finally, Basic Principles 10, 11, and 12 work 
together to ensure that judges have “appropriate training or qualifications in 
law”, and are adequately remunerated and given terms and tenure “secured 
by law.”75 
 As demonstrated by the Basic Principles, the principle of 
independence is more about structure or “institutional design” and reflects 
objective criteria such as “financial and job security.”76  As noted in Basic 
Principles 10 to 12, the other side of independence is the requirement that 
judges possess “a solid understanding of the law, as well as experience with 
the task of adjudication.”77  The Canadian Supreme Court has described 
judicial independence as based on the relationship between institutions (i.e. 
the executive and judiciary) and individuals (i.e. between the judge and 
executive).78 
 While financial and job security are some of the aspects to 
independence, the independence of judicial decision making is one 
necessary aspect worth highlighting, as it is essential to discussing the 
independence of review boards in later sections.  This concept is briefly 
mentioned in Basic Principle 1, which refers to the need for other 
government institutions to respect the independence of the judiciary.79  The 
underlying concept is that “the Executive, the Legislature, as well as other 
authorities, such as the police, prison, social and educational authorities, 
                                                 
71. Id. at 60. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Basic Principles, supra note 69, at 60. 
75. Id. at 61. 
76. Diane M. Amann, Punish or Surveil, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 873, 900 
(2007). 
77. Id. at 901. 
78. Valente v. The Queen [1985] S.C.R. 673 (Can.). 
79. Basic Principles, supra note 69, at 60. 
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must respect and abide by the judgements and decisions of the Judiciary, 
even when they do not agree with them.”80  The right of the judiciary to 
make a binding decision that other governmental authorities must respect 
will be referred to in this article as “the right to order release”.81 
 On the other hand, the principle of judicial impartiality is generally 
viewed as a more subjective concept under international law, although there 
are objective elements.82  Basic Principle 2 mandates that a judge must be 
free to “decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in 
accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, 
inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any 
quarter or for any reason.”83 
 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has opined on the nature of 
impartiality at least with respect to the meaning of Article 14(1) of the 
ICCPR.84  The HRC stated in Arvo O. Karttunen v. Finland that impartiality 
“implies that judges must not harbor preconceptions about the matter put 
before them, and that they must not act in ways that promote the interests of 
one of the parties.”85  Likewise in the Valente case, the Canadian Supreme 
Court referred to impartiality as “a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal 
in relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case.”86 
 Of immediate relevance to this discussion of the PRBs is the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights decision in the Constitutional 
Rights Project, where it found a violation of article 7(1)(d) of the Charter 
merely because there were military personnel sitting along with a judge on 
Nigeria’s Special Tribunal.87  The Commission found that the composition 
of the Special Tribunal “alone create[d] the appearance, if not actual lack, 
of impartiality.”88  The composition of a judicial body could represent one 
of the more objective indicators of impartiality, even if the judges/decision-
                                                 
80. OHCHR & Int’l Bar Association, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice:  A 
Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, PROF. TRAINING SERIES No. 9, 1, 121 
(2003), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter4en.pdf. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 120. 
83. Basic Principles, supra note 69, at 60; Amann, supra note 76, at 902. 
84. See generally U.N. doc. GAOR, A/48/40 (vol. II) U.N. Communication No. 387/1989, 
Arvo O. Karttunen v. Finland (Views adopted on Oct. 23, 1992). 
85. Id. at 120. 
86. Valente v. The Queen [1985] S.C.R. 673 (Can.). 
87. Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 87/93, African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.]. ¶ 5 (1995), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa 
/comcases/87-93.html. 
88. Id. at ¶ 14. 
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makers themselves do not have a personal bias.89  The issue of 
independence and impartiality of the PRBs will be discussed further in Part 
IV. 
5. Prohibition Against Self-incrimination? 
 The protection against self-incrimination is a well-settled principle of 
law, including under IHL.90  Article 75(4)(f) AP I, which is generally 
considered to be a rule of customary law,91 states that “no one shall be 
compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.”92  Under United 
States domestic law, this right is enshrined by the Fifth Amendment, but 
this right has been held to only apply if such statements are going to be 
used or are used in criminal proceedings.93  Thus, the application of the 
Fifth Amendment to a non-criminal, administrative setting like that of the 
PRB, is far less clear and beyond the scope of this paper to resolve.  
Nonetheless, it is worth flagging in light of the practical implications it has 
in a detainee’s determination whether and to what extent to participate in 
the PRBs.  A few suggestions on how to practically remove this issue from 
the debate are offered in Part IV. 
 Periodic Reviews of Internment in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
 As the black letter law of NIAC does not mention detention review or 
any right to challenge detention, this section must examine other sources of 
law including customary IHL on the right to challenge detention and review 
mechanisms in the context of NIAC.94  The vast majority of practice in this 
area has taken place in the past decade—with the emergence of long-term 
NIAC detention by western states in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
                                                 
89. See, e.g., Daktaras v. Lithuania, App. No. 42095/98, ¶ 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
90. See, e.g., Practice Relating to Rule 100.  Fair Trial Guarantees (Section J. Compelling 
accused persons to testify against themselves or to confess guilt), Int’l Comm’n H.R., https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule100_sectionj. 
91. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, Fact Sheet, supra note 12. 
92. ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at art. 75(4)(f).  
93. The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be compelled . . . in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.  But see Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2007) (“the 
general rule is that a person has no claim for civil liability based on the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee 
against compelled self-incrimination unless compelled statements are admitted against him in a criminal 
case …”). 
94. Int’l Comm. Red Cross [ICRC], Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security 
Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict, 6, 15 (Sept. 22–23, 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng 
/assets/files/other/security-detention-chatham-icrc-report-091209.pdf. 
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Guantanamo, as well as the increase in the (usually) short-term detention by 
international peacekeepers—so, it should not come as a surprise that this 
custom is not yet clear.95  Because customary IHL appears to be undecided 
with respect to periodic review mechanisms, this section also examines 
IHRL to determine whether that body of law provides additional rules that 
could be applied instead of or alongside customary IHL during NIAC.  
Alternatively, in the absence of any clear rules of customary IHL or IHRL, 
this paper also addresses whether IAC rules could be applied by analogy. 
 Rule 99 of the ICRC’s CIHL Study provides mandatory initial reviews 
of detention in NIAC but does not discuss periodic reviews.96  There is very 
little written about the obligation, composition or comportment of detention 
review boards in NIACs (or in IACs, for that matter).  Lawrence Hill-
Cawthorne’s seminal work on detention rules in NIACs provides a detailed 
overview of procedural guarantees under both IHL and IHRL.97  However, 
the section on internment reviews—including both initial and periodic 
reviews—is notably brief, albeit providing a number of helpful 
observations.98  He compares Article 43 and 78 of GC IV, but finds that 
even in IACs, “procedures to be followed by the review bodies are not 
prescribed.”99  He notes that initial reviews must:  i) take place as soon as 
possible after the person is detained, and ii) the reviewing body must be a 
“board,” not a “single person.”100  Otherwise, he finds no particular 
requirements about the composition of the review board, the right to be 
represented or call witnesses, or the “standard of review to be applied.”101   
 The ICRC determined that certain procedural safeguards are required 
in any form of security or administrative detention setting which takes place 
in armed conflict, based on both the spirit and purpose of IHL and human 
rights norms.102  ICRC guidelines on Procedural Safeguards in 
                                                 
95. See generally Miles P. Fischer, Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to “Armed 
Conflict” in the War on Terror, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 3 (2006); Bruce Oswald, The Copenhagen 
Principles, International Military Operations and Detentions, J. OF INT’L PEACEKEEPING, Vol. 17, 116, 
117 (2013), available at:  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478519. 
96. ICRC, CIHL, supra note 64. 
97. See generally LAWRENCE HILL-CAWTHORNE, DETENTION IN NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT (Oxford University Press 2016). 
98. See id. 
99. Id. at 53. 
100. Id. at 53–54. 
101. Id. 
102. Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative 
Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS, 
388–89 (2005). 
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Internment/Administrative Detention set out the standards applicable for 
periodic reviews of detention.103   
The purpose of the periodical review is to ascertain whether the 
detainee continues to pose a real threat to the security of the 
detaining power and to order release if that is not the case.  All 
the safeguards that apply to the initial review must apply to the 
periodical review(s) as well, which, among other things, means 
that the review has to be effective and must be conducted by an 
independent and impartial body . . . Internment/administrative 
detention will in practice be regulated by the domestic law of the 
State involved in a non-international armed conflict or other 
situation of violence, meaning that a person’s ability to challenge 
the lawfulness of his or her internment/administrative detention 
will be regulated by those norms.  If the relevant domestic law 
makes no such provision, it is submitted that at least six-monthly 
reviews of internment/administrative detention should be 
provided for, similar to the rules applicable in international 
armed conflicts.104 
The ICRC’s updated Commentary to the First Geneva Convention 
(GC I) mentions the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention in NIAC 
before an independent and impartial review board in its revised 
commentary on Common Article 3.105  It recognizes that, “the review of 
lawfulness of internment must be carried out by an independent and 
impartial body.”106  “Where internment review is administrative rather than 
judicial in nature, ensuring the requisite independence and impartiality of 
the review body will require particular attention.”107 
 While these interpretations are highly regarded and often quoted by 
the international legal community, they represent ICRC’s—not states’—
views about procedural safeguards for internment or administrative 
                                                 
103. Id. at 388. 
104. Id. at 388–89. 
105. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, construed in ICRC, Commentary to Common Article 3 of the First 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, ¶ 722–23 (1960) [hereinafter ICRC, Commentary of 2016, Article 3]. 
106. Id. at ¶ 723. 
107. Id. 
The guidelines also provide for the right to periodical review of the lawfulness of continued 
internment.  Periodical review obliges the detaining authority to ascertain whether the detainee 
continues to pose an imperative threat to security and to order release if that is not the case.  The 
safeguards that apply to initial review are also to be applied at periodical review.  Id. at ¶ 724. 
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detention.108  The ICRC itself admits that the rules are still not as clear as 
they would like, recognizing that “the question of which standards and 
safeguards are required in NIAC to prevent arbitrariness is still subject to 
debate and needs further clarification, in part linked to unresolved issues on 
the interplay between international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law.”109  However, as noted in the 2005 ICRC Procedural 
Safeguards guidelines:  
The reason for outlining the procedural principles and safeguards 
that govern internment/administrative detention is that although 
this type of deprivation of liberty is often practised in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts and other 
situations of violence, the protection of the rights of the persons 
affected by it is insufficiently elaborated.110 
At the time, the ICRC based the majority of its arguments about basic 
procedural guarantees in administrative detention on some combination of 
legal provisions identified in GC IV, Article 75 of AP I, and/or human 
rights law.111  Under the rules of IAC, the ICRC acknowledged that states 
are given the choice between courts and administrative review boards for 
the initial detention challenge.112  However, for NIACs, the ICRC asserted 
that:  
[H]uman rights law and jurisprudence applicable to situations of 
non-international armed conflict or other situations of violence 
unequivocally require that challenges to the lawfulness of 
internment/administrative detention be heard by a court.  Under 
the ICCPR, anyone deprived of liberty is entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide 
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his 
release if the detention is not lawful.113 
The requirement for a judicial hearing would seem to be with respect 
to the initial right to challenge one’s detention, but some states have not 
signed up to the applicable human rights treaties or have interpreted their 
                                                 
108. Id. at ¶ 725. 
109. Id. 
110. Pejic, supra note 102, at 376. 
111. See generally ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at art. 75. 
112. Pejic, supra note 102, at 387. 
113. Id. 
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obligations differently.114  However, even if one accepts that judicial review 
of detention in NIAC is a non-derogable right under IHRL, it does not 
answer the question of whether periodic reviews are also required. 
 The ICRC is not alone in trying to establish the necessity of periodic 
review mechanisms for NIAC detention.  Ashley Deeks, a United States 
expert on the laws of war, argues that the “core procedures contained in the 
Fourth Geneva Convention are battle-tested and serve as an excellent basis 
for administrative detention during all types of armed conflict.”115  IHL 
provides a “near-term ability to challenge that detention before a court or an 
administrative board (at the choice of the state)” in part because IHL 
recognizes that mistakes are easy to make on the battlefield.116  In other 
words, detention in NIAC should “require the state to immediately review 
that detention, permit the detainee to appeal the initial detention decision, 
require the state to review the detention periodically, and obligate the state 
to release the detainee when the reasons for his detention have ceased.”117  
However, Deeks recognizes that rules for internment review, even under 
GC IV, are vague at best.118 
 Regardless of whether the right to challenge detention before a judicial 
body is a non-derogable right during peacetime and armed conflict, states 
have acknowledged the need for periodic, administrative review boards.119  
In light of the particular challenges of coalition warfare in extraterritorial 
NIACs (e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq), twenty-four states came together to 
create a body of non-binding guidelines for these types of situations—The 
Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines.120  In its preamble, it is 
                                                 
114. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, for example, has said that the writ of habeas 
corpus does not to apply extraterritorially to non-citizens.  See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). 
115. Ashley Deeks, Security Detention:  The International Legal Framework:  Administrative 
Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 403, 405 (2009). 
116. Id.   
117. Id. at 408.  Deeks also asserts that IHL is more suited to battlefield detention than IHRL in 
part because it allows for some flexibility in wartime conditions.  See id. at 408–09.  
118. Id. at 409–10. 
119. Arguments for why periodic reviews are needed even when judicial review is present is 
made in the next section. 
120. The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military 
Operations, ¶ I (Oct. 19, 2012), https://erasmusmais.pt/uploads/files/references/copenhangen_process-
590ccac4a79a8.pdf [hereinafter Copenhagen Process].  These twenty-four states are:  Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Tanzania, the Netherlands, Turkey, 
Uganda, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.  Id.  Additionally, the following non-
state actors participated:  the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and the ICRC.  Id. 
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described as “intended to apply to international military operations in the 
context of non-international armed conflicts and peace operations; they are 
not intended to address international armed conflicts.”121  The Copenhagen 
Guidelines reflect the understanding of many states that NIAC detention in 
an extraterritorial conflict is not necessarily subject to judicial review, but 
that detainees should be able to challenge their detention before a 
competent body.122  Principle 12 of the Copenhagen Guidelines states that, 
“[a] detainee whose liberty has been deprived for security reasons is to, in 
addition to a prompt initial review, have the decision to detain reconsidered 
periodically by an impartial and objective authority that is authorized to 
determine the lawfulness and appropriateness of continued detention.”123  
While the Copenhagen Guidelines do not represent a legal authority, they 
reflect emerging state practice on the issue.   
 In conclusion, there is no treaty-based rule, nor does there appear to be 
a customary rule of IHL on periodic reviews for NIAC detention, although 
there is some indication that this norm could be slowly emerging based on 
state practice.  The next section looks at whether IHRL, which applies at all 
times, requires periodic reviews in addition to any initial judicial reviews 
IHLR would require. 
 Periodic Reviews of Internment Under International Human Rights 
Law 
 Security or administrative detention in relation to an armed conflict is 
generally frowned upon under most IHRL regimes, but is not prohibited 
outright, although it may require derogation, at least from certain regional 
treaty regimes like the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).124  The 
starting point for security detention under IHRL comes from the ICCPR 
and corresponding rulings or opinions by the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC).  According to the HRC: 
                                                 
121. Id. at 1. 
122. Id. at 2. 
123. Id. at 4. 
124. See id. 
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if so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public 
security . . . it must not be arbitrary, and must be based on 
grounds and procedures established by law . . . information of the 
reasons must be given . . . and court control of the detention must 
be available . . . as well as compensation in the case of a 
breach.125   
Where security detention is used, however, IHRL requires that 
detainees be given the opportunity to challenge their detention before a 
judicial body, and at least the HRC has stipulated that this right is non-
derogable.126   
 Claire Macken’s often-quoted and comprehensive analysis of 
preventive detention under the ICCPR provides a useful overview of 
procedural guarantees for security detention under IHRL and discusses the 
fundamental right to challenge security detention under the ICCPR.127  
According to Macken, detainees must have the right to challenge their 
detention before a competent body, which is normally read to mean the 
right to habeas corpus.128  Nonetheless, in looking at the travaux 
preparatoire, it seems “the reference to habeas corpus was deleted in order 
to specify that states must be free to allow for such a right of appeal within 
the framework of their own legal systems.”129 
 While IHRL may not directly provide for periodic administrative 
review boards, some human rights courts entertain the notion of them in the 
context of IACs.130  The ECHR, for example, accepted that frequent 
periodic reviews by a “competent body” for civilian internees in IAC could 
be compatible with Article 5 of the ECHR, so long as the body provides 
“sufficient guarantees of impartiality and fair procedure to protect against 
                                                 
125. U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment no. 8, Art. 9 (16th Sess., 1982), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 at 8, ¶ 4 (1994). 
126. ICCPR, supra note 68, at art. 9 (4); U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee (HRC), General Comment 
no. 29, Art. 4, States of Emergency, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), ¶11. 
127. Claire Macken, Preventative Detention and the Right of Personal Liberty and Security 
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 26 ADELAIDE L. REV. 1, 27 
(2005). 
128. Id. at 24. 
129. Id. (quoting MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE ‘TRAVAUX PRÉPATORIES’ OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 213 (1987)). 
130. See id. at 8–9 (noting that some human rights courts, like the Nato-led Kosovo Force 
(KFOR), follows the notion of administrative review boards). 
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arbitrariness.”131  The United Kingdom Supreme Court has also posited that 
periodic reviews may be appropriate in certain circumstances where habeas 
is impracticable.132   
 Therefore, one can conclude that while IHRL may not directly provide 
for periodic reviews in IACs, it does not exclude them.133  For example, in 
Rameka v. New Zealand, the HRC held that: 
While preventive detention for the purpose of protecting the 
public against dangerous criminals is not prohibited as such 
under the Covenant and its imposition sometimes cannot be 
avoided, it must be subject to the strictest procedural safeguards, 
as provided for in article 9 of the Covenant, including the 
possibility for periodic review, by a court, of the continuing 
lawfulness of such detention.  Such reviews are necessary as any 
human person has the potential to change and improve, i.e. to 
become less dangerous over time (e.g. as a consequence of inner 
growth or of a successful therapy, or as a result of an ailment 
reducing his physical abilities to commit a specific category of 
crimes).134  
It is even less clear with NIACs as there is no IHL treaty provision on 
which IHRL bodies can rely, and IHRL does not provide any explicit treaty 
basis for periodic reviews of the legality of detention, at least in the sense of 
NIAC detention reviews.135  Nonetheless, the HRC “has held that detention 
which may have initially been legal may become arbitrary if it is unduly 
prolonged or not subject to periodic review.”136  At least some forms of 
periodic review of administrative detention (e.g. immigration detention) 
appear to be part of the fundamental guarantees needed to protect against 
                                                 
131. Vaios Koutroulis, Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium:  Detention in Armed Conflict, 
15th Bruges Colloquium Oct. 16–17, 2014 (quoting Hassan v. UK, App No 29750/09, Judgment, 45 
(Grand Chamber), Sept. 16, 2014). 
132. See Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence (2017) UKSC 2, at 103. 
133. “There is no specified periodicity of review available to persons detained in non-
international armed conflicts or other situations of violence, because human rights law does not limit the 
frequency of challenges that may be submitted by an interned/administratively detained person to the 
lawfulness of detention (habeas corpus petitions).”  See Pejic, supra note 102, at 388–99.  
134. Rameka v. New Zealand, CCPR/C/79/D/1090/2002 (2003), individual opinion of 
Committee member Mr. Walter Kälin (dissenting in part). 
135. See ICRC, Internment in Armed Conflict, supra note 26, at 1, 6. 
136. Submission to the U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee (HRC), General comment no. 35, Art. 9 
(109th Sess. 14 Oct.–1 Nov. 2013), Liberty and Security of the Person, for the Consideration of the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee, Geneva, EQUAL RTS TRUST 1, 9 Oct. 2013. 
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arbitrary detention.137  Therefore, HRC jurisprudence would at least seem to 
accept the necessity of periodic reviews if security detention takes place. 
 Dissenting in the Rameka case, Mr. Kalin considered that “the 
compulsory annual reviews of detention” by the Parole Board, which were 
“subject to judicial review in the High Court and Court of Appeal,” may 
have met the standard of non-arbitrariness with respect to detention since 
the detention had been subject to “regular periodic reviews of the individual 
case by an independent body.”138  However, with little additional IHRL 
case law on the subject of periodic reviews, and almost no case law on 
periodic review for security or NIAC detention, it is difficult to determine 
how bodies like the HRC would interpret a requirement to have periodic 
reviews by an administrative, rather than a judicial, body. 
 Habeas petitions, or their equivalent, are generally available at any 
time under IHRL, so there is no particular periodicity attached.139  
However, a typical habeas petition is intended to challenge the lawfulness 
of detention and must be proactively brought by the petitioner.140  Regular, 
periodic administrative reviews of detention may serve the same purpose of 
challenging the lawfulness of detention (or in some systems, the continued 
“need” for detention even if such detention is per se lawful), but they 
should at least in theory be faster and less burdensome than a full-blown 
court proceeding, and should be automatic in nature.  Furthermore, IHRL 
does not take into account the battlefield context, where access to habeas 
courts (particularly if the courts sit in a third state) may prove to be 
logistically impossible or at least far less efficient than an on-site 
administrative review board.141   
 Thus, while IHRL may not specifically provide for periodic review 
boards in NIAC, it does not exclude them and in very narrow circumstances 
may consider them an appropriate alternative when there is no access to 
judicial proceedings.142 
                                                 
137. Alfred de Zayas, Human Rights and Indefinite Detention, 87 INT’L. REV. RED CROSS 15, 
17–18, 29 (2005). 
138. Rameka, CCPR/C/79/D/1090/2002 ¶ 7.3. 
139. Brian Farrell, Habeas Corpus in International Law 3 (May 4, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, National University of Ireland, Galway); see Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). 
140. Farrell, supra note 139, at 2, 157; ICRC, CIHL, supra note 64; Richard Nicholson, 
Functionalism ’s Military Necessity Problem:  Extraterritorial Habeas Corpus, Justice Kennedy, 
Boumediene v. Bush, and Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1393, 1399 (2012). 
141. Farrell, supra note 139, at 290–91.  
142. ICRC, Internment in Armed Conflict, supra note 26, at 2. 
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 Periodic Reviews of Internment Under United States’ Domestic Law 
 Since the PRBs were established by executive order, their existence is 
a matter of policy and can be overturned in an instant, and PRBs are not 
available to any United States law-of-war detainees outside of Guantanamo, 
so it is important to examine United States’ domestic law on the issue of 
periodic reviews.143  While there is no explicit domestic legislation 
requiring periodic reviews in relation to any armed conflict or security 
detention, the Department of Defense Law of War Manual (DoD LOW 
Manual) sets out a framework for establishing reviews in detention 
operations carried out by the Department of Defense (DoD).144 
 For IACs, DoD clearly follows the provisions of GC IV.  According to 
§ 10.9.2.3, civilian internees:  
[S]hall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as 
possible by an appropriate court or administrative board 
designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.  If the 
internment or placement in assigned residence is maintained, the 
court or administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice 
yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the 
favorable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances 
permit.145 
 With respect to persons detained in NIACs or to “unprivileged 
belligerents,” the DoD LOW Manual reflects its own practice rather than 
binding legal norms, and permits “unprivileged belligerents” to be detained 
until the end of hostilities.146  However, it also notes “DoD practice has 
been to review periodically the detention of all persons not afforded POW 
status or treatment.”147  Section 8.14.2 reflects additional DoD practice for 
persons detained for “security reasons” but not designated as “unprivileged 
belligerents.”148  For these individuals, DoD notes that the practice “is to 
have, in addition to a prompt initial review, the decision to detain 
reconsidered periodically by an impartial and objective authority that is 
                                                 
143. See Executive Order No. 13567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Exec. 
Order No. 13567].  
144. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, Department of Defense Law of War Manual, ¶ 10.9.2.3 (June 
2015) [hereinafter DOD Law of War Manual] (the Manual does not represent binding law, but it reflects 
the Department of Defense’s interpretation of the laws of war).  
145. Id.  
146. Id. at ¶ 4.19.3.4. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at ¶ 8.14.2. 
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authorized to determine the lawfulness and appropriateness of continued 
detention.”149  The review board could be either military or civilian in 
nature.150   
 This section also suggests that reviews may not be every six months, 
but would: 
depend on a variety of factors, including:  (1) operational 
necessities or resource constraints, such as force protection, the 
availability of interpreters, or large numbers of detainees; (2) the 
thoroughness of the review process; and (3) whether there is a 
true prospect that the legal or factual predicates justifying 
detention have changed.151   
In keeping with IHL, the DoD LOW Manual accepts that “such 
persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event 
as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention, or internment 
have ceased to exist.”152  However, the DoD LOW Manual also recognizes 
that “[a]s a matter of policy, release of lawfully detained persons often 
occurs before the conclusion of hostilities.”153 
 In conclusion, there is no clearly binding rule of international or 
domestic law providing for periodic reviews of NIAC detention.  
Nonetheless, it would appear from emerging customary norms, IHRL, and 
the spirit and purpose of IHL, that detainees held in relation to NIAC must 
be permitted to challenge their detention periodically in order to prevent it 
from being, or becoming, arbitrary in nature.  The preference will always be 
that such challenges take place before a court, at least initially.  Regardless, 
periodic reviews should be regularly and automatically provided to prevent 
detention from becoming arbitrary in nature, since such detainees have not 
been charged or convicted as part of a criminal proceeding. 
III. PERIODIC REVIEWS FOR GUANTANAMO DETAINEES 
 The United States is by far the greatest promoter of ad hoc 
administrative reviews of security or NIAC detention.154  The United States 
has tried, adapted, re-launched, and settled upon numerous variations of 
                                                 
149. DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 144, at ¶ 8.14.2.  
150. Id. at ¶ 8.14.2. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at ¶ 8.14.3. 
153. Id. at ¶ 8.14.3.1. 
154. This article will refer to “security detention” or “NIAC detention” interchangeably.  Any 
use of the term “security detention” refers to administrative detention in relation to an armed conflict 
and subject to LOAC rules.   
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these reviews in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.155  The scope of this 
article does not permit an in-depth analysis of each past process, but some 
background is needed to understand the evolution of the detention review 
processes in the United States.156 
 Legal Status of Guantanamo Detainees  
 The majority of Guantanamo detainees were captured in relation to the 
conflict in Afghanistan.157  However, the classification of that conflict, and 
therefore the status of the detainees, has never been straightforward.  Most 
IHL scholars consider the conflict in Afghanistan to have been an IAC 
between the United States and the Taliban from the commencement of 
active hostilities on October 7, 2001, until the election of Hamid Karzai by 
the Loya Jirga on June 19, 2002.158  This means that those Guantanamo 
detainees captured in that period should have received protected status as 
either POWs under GC III or as civilian internees under GC IV.  Initially, 
the United States government did not acknowledge the existence of an IAC, 
and at one point even refused to apply the rules of NIAC.159  However, the 
                                                 
155. See generally Thomas B. Nachbar, Executive Branch Policy Meets International Law in 
the Evolution of the Domestic Law of Detention, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 201 (2013). 
156. It is also important to note that the United States uses a bifurcated system separating the 
grounds for detention and the imperative security threat posed by NIAC detainees.  Geneva Convention 
I Wounded and Sick in the Field, Introduction, B(1)(f), Aug. 12, 1949; see also, Eric Talbot Jensen, 
Applying a Sovereign Agency Theory of the Law of Armed Conflict, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 685, 692 (2012).  
In practice this means that in the United States and in Guantanamo, any initial challenge to the 
lawfulness of detention is subject to federal habeas review.  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., About the Periodic 
Review Board, PERIODIC REV. SECRETARIAT, http://www.prs.mil/About-the-PRB/ (last visited Jan. 18, 
2018) [hereinafter DOD, About the Periodic Review Board].  The initial grounds for detention is 
confirmed by a federal civilian court when challenged by a detainee, whereas the security threat and 
necessity of continued detention is examined by an administrative board.  Cong. Research Serv., 
R40139, 3, 12 (2011).  In all other contexts, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the legal and threat 
bifurcation remains in theory, but detainees are not entitled to habeas challenges, and thus may only 
challenge the need for continued detention by demonstrating to an administrative board that they do not 
(or no longer) pose a threat to security.  David G. Savage & Christi Parsons, Court:  No habeas Rights 
for Prisoners in Afghanistan, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 21, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
print/2010/may/21/nation/la-na-court-bagram-20100522. 
157. Joy Olson, WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., Guantanamo Fact Sheet, Background, ¶ 6 (Dec. 
5, 2014), https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/WOLA%20General/Guantanamo%20 
Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
158. See, e.g., Robin Geiss & Michael Siegrist, Has the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan Affected 
the Rules on the Conduct of Hostilities?, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS, 11 (2011). 
159. See, e.g., Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, (Jan. 22, 
2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-laws-taliban-detainees. 
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United States’ Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held the conflict in 
which Guantanamo detainees had been captured was at the very least a 
NIAC governed by Common Article 3.160  Since NIACs provide no clear 
status or special protections, unlike those found for POWs, detainees in 
Guantanamo are left with very little black letter law on which to rely.161  To 
add to the uncertainty, the United States has treated individuals captured in 
Afghanistan and transferred to Guantanamo as unprivileged enemy 
belligerents, a status not found in IHL or elsewhere in international law, but 
which seems to have crystallized in United States domestic law.162   
 The detention facility at Guantanamo is truly sui generis, both 
factually and legally, so both the conditions of detention and the legal abyss 
in which it exists are unlikely to be reproduced, and thus the rules or 
policies that arise out of it are almost impossible to apply in a more 
“normal” battlefield context.  However, the United States authorities have 
experimented with different kinds of security review processes, including 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and Administrative Review 
                                                 
pdf; see also, Miles P. Fischer, Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to “Armed Conflict” in the War 
on Terror, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 509, 512 (2006). 
160. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 563 (2006). 
161. While the text of the 2001 AUMF does reference persons participating in the 9/11 attacks 
against the United States, the majority of later habeas cases do not reflect any direct connection between 
those held in Guantanamo as NIAC detainees and persons who would meet the narrow criteria of 
persons involved, even tangentially, in the attacks on the World Trade Center.  See Hathaway et al., 
supra note 27, at 123, 125, 129, 130–31 (2013).  This excludes the handful of Guantanamo detainees 
specifically charged in relation to these attacks of course.  Id. at 130.  Later legislation, such as the 
Military Commissions Act or the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2012 provided 
some post-hoc guidance on status of persons in Guantanamo, but the vast majority of Guantanamo 
detainees had already arrived by 2006 (and certainly by 2012), meaning the 2001 AUMF was the sole 
legal basis for detaining these individuals.  Cong. Research Serv., R42143, 3 (2016).  As the 2006 (and 
later 2009) Military Commissions Act only governs prosecution for war crimes and thus affects only a 
small number of detainees held, it is reasonable to argue that there was no significant clarification of 
status between the 2001 AUMF and the 2012 NDAA when Congress finally defined persons who could 
be detained under the 2001 AUMF.  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 
1540, 112th Cong. (2011). 
162. Many articles have been written on unprivileged enemy belligerents (also known as 
unlawful enemy combatants) so this paper will not dwell on this issue except to flag the terminology.  
For sources supporting the notion of an “unprivileged [enemy] belligerent.”  See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, 
Warriors Without Rights?  Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, in 
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 45–67 (2005); see 
generally Scott Reid, Terrorists as Enemy Combatants:  An Analysis of How the United States Applies 
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Global War on Terrorism (Feb. 9, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) 
(Naval War College).  But see, Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged 
Combatants”, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 45 (2003); Laura M. Olson, Guantanamo Habeas Review:  
Are the D.C. District Court’s Decisions Consistent with IHL Internment Standards, 42 CASE W. RES. 
REV. J. INT’L L. 197, 214 (2009). 
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Boards (ARBs).163  There were a number of major shortcomings with these 
processes, including the fact that detainees barely had any time to prepare a 
defense, did not have access to private counsel, and that the final decision 
to order release or transfer was not made by the Board itself.164 
 Both the CSRTs and ARBs were highly criticized and were 
discontinued around 2007 as new arrivals ceased.165  Newly elected 
President Obama ordered his own review of the status of detainees in 
Guantanamo, which was known as the Guantanamo Review Task Force.166  
It published its findings in January 2010, but as with the previous reviews, 
it was without the formal participation of detainees, and thus did not 
provide the kind of review process foreseen by international law.167  
 Executive Order 13567 and the Progression of PRBs from 2013-2016 
 When it became clear that the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility was 
not going to close as promptly as planned and that habeas was not proving 
to be a very expedient way for detainees to challenge their continued 
detention, new procedures and policies were put in place to allow detainees 
an additional means of challenging their continued detention.168  The PRBs 
were established by Executive Order 13567 (EO 13567) on March 7, 
2011.169  The “Implementing Guidelines for Periodic Review of Detainees 
Held at Guantanamo Bay per Executive Order 13567,” which set out the 
specific procedures for these reviews, were not promulgated until May 9, 
2012.170  The first PRB hearing did not take place until November 2013,171 
                                                 
163. Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767, 785–86 (2008).  
164. Thomas R. Johnson, Combatant Status Review Tribunals:  An Ordeal Through the Eyes of 
One “Enemy Combatant”, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 943, 947–50 (2007); see generally Brian J. 
Foley, Guantanamo and Beyond:  Dangers of Rigging the Rules, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1009 
(2007). 
165. Boumedine, 553 U.S. at 767, 785–86 (2008). 
166. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, & JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Final 
Report:  Guantanamo Review Task Force (2010). 
167. Id. 
168. See generally Benjamin Wittes et. al., The Emerging Law of Detention 2.0 The 
Guantánamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, HARV. L. SCH. NAT’L SEC. RESEARCH COMM., (Apr. 2012), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Chesney-Full-Text-Update32913.pdf (for more 
information on the difficulties that habeas cases have run into with respect to Guantanamo detainees, 
and the ways in which they can challenge their detentions). 
169. Exec. Order No. 13567, supra note 143, at 1377. 
170. OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, 
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY:  EXTENSION APPROVAL FOR DIRECTIVE-TYPE 
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and the last remaining PRB-eligible detainee did not receive an initial 
hearing until September 8, 2016.172 
 EO 13567 established that continued detention would be mandated so 
long as the concerned detainee posed a “significant” threat to the United 
States.173  Each detainee is entitled to an initial full review within one 
year,174 to an in-person hearing, and a file review every six months 
thereafter.  Every three years, the detainee is entitled to another full review 
with an in-person hearing, although a file review could result in an order of 
an earlier full review.175  The PRB is comprised of members from each of 
the following six agencies:  Department of State, Department of Defense, 
Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.176 
 EO 13567 also instituted procedures for a full review, and each 
detainee is:177 
                                                 
MEMORANDUM (DTM) 12-005 “IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES FOR PERIODIC REVIEW OF DETAINEES 
HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13567 (2012) [hereinafter DOD MEMORANDUM]. 
171. Periodic Review Secretariat, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.prs.mil/Review-
Information/Initial-Review/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Periodic Review Secretariat 
Statistics]; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Initial Review, Periodic Review Secretariat, http://www.prs.mil/Review-
Information/Initial-Review/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter DoD, Initial Review]. 
172. Periodic Review Secretariat Statistics, supra note 171. 
173. Exec. Order No. 13567, supra note 143, at 13277. 
174. As noted, in practice it took approximately three to five years for a detainee to receive an 
initial review.  See Periodic Review Secretariat Statistics, supra note 171. 
175. Exec. Order No. 13567, supra note 143, at 13279. 
176. Id. at 13280. 
177. Id. at 13277–78.  The file review follows identical procedures except there is no in-person 
hearing so all statements must be submitted in writing to the Board.  Id. at 13279. 
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i) given advance notice of the hearing date, and is 
“provided, in writing and in a language the detainee 
understands” with an unclassified summary of the 
reasons for continued detention;178 
ii) assigned a military personal representative (PR) and 
may acquire private counsel (PC) at no cost to the 
government;179 
iii) permitted to make any written or oral statements, 
secure the statements of witnesses (e.g., family and 
home-country officials or elders), and answer any 
questions that were posed by the Board itself.180 
 In addition to reviewing the materials or statements provided by the 
detainee and his PR/PC, the PRB also considers evidence collected and 
coordinated by the DoD.181  This information is provided by multiple 
agencies, including the intelligence agencies, and has undergone a review in 
which all information obtained through torture is presumably removed.182   
 The Board then makes a determination whether continued detention is 
necessary, and all members of the Board must be in consensus.183  If the 
Board determines that detention is no longer warranted, “the PRB shall also 
recommend any conditions that relate to the detainee's transfer.”184  This 
recommendation is then submitted to a Review Committee comprised of the 
principals of the six different government agencies who are given thirty 
days to ask for a review of the PRB’s recommendation.185  The Review 
Committee may also intervene if the Board is unable to reach a 
consensus.186  This author was unable to find any direct evidence of the 
Review Committee overturning a recommendation made by the Board, but 
by looking at the speed in which most initial decisions were reached (i.e., 
within the 30 days in which the Board has been given to overturn a 
                                                 
178. Id. at 13277. 
179. Exec. Order No. 13567, supra note 143, at 13278. 
180. Id.  
181. Id. 
182. Id.  The author cannot attest to the quality of this review and therefore makes no assertion 
as to whether such evidence is indeed considered in the PRB review.  
183. Id. 
184. In practice this has meant that the Board recommends repatriation or resettlement to a 
third country.  On occasion, the Board has made more specific recommendations about the preferred 
third country or the need for time spent in a rehabilitation center.  See Exec. Order No. 13567, supra 
note 143, at 13278. 
185. Id. at 13279–80. 
186. Id. 
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decision), it would seem that at least more often than not, the Review 
Committee has respected the decision of the Board.187  However, the fact 
that the Board cannot order release is a serious threat to its independence, 
even if the Review Committee uses this power sparingly. 
 In stark comparison to the “success” rate of CSRTs and ARBs, PRBs 
have cleared significantly more detainees for transfer.188  Clearing and 
transferring detainees are significant factors in determining whether the 
reviews are robust, because one would expect many mistakes or oversights 
when individuals are detained on the “hot battlefield.”189  The PRB 
determined at least one detainee to be a case of mistaken identity and to not 
have met the criteria for “unprivileged enemy belligerent,” which the 
CSRTs failed to acknowledge, and many more have been determined not to 
pose a significant threat to the United States or at least not a significant 
enough threat to merit continued detention.190  Of the sixty-four PRB 
eligible detainees, thirty-two were cleared in their initial review and did not 
have to undergo further reviews.191  Additional detainees have been cleared 
in subsequent reviews.192   
 The different outcomes between PRBs and previous review processes 
are hard to pinpoint, but there are a few key factors.  First, evidence 
obtained from torture and ill-treatment was generally omitted in the PRBs 
through a CIDT (Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment) interagency 
                                                 
187. Periodic Review Secretariat Statistics, supra note 171.  This statement is based on a 
review of PRB decisions on the PRS website.  See id. 
188. According to the Heritage Foundation, the CSRTs conducted 572 hearings between 2004 
and 2007; of those, only 38 detainees were determined not to be enemy combatants and were sent home.  
See CHRIS EDELSON, POWER WITHOUT CONSTRAINT 64 (UNIV. OF WIS. PRESS, 2016); Timothy Book, 
Review Process Unprecedented, 6 THE WIRE 1, 9 (Mar. 10, 2006).  According to the Joint Task Force 
Guantanamo Public Affairs Office, by March 2006 the ARBs had made 463 board recommendations 
resulting in 14 recommendations for release, 119 recommendations for transfer (i.e. custody in a third 
country), and 330 decisions for continued detention.  Book, supra note 188, at 1.  In contrast, 36 of the 
64 PRB eligible detainees were transferred out of Guantanamo by January 2017.  Guantanamo Periodic 
Review Boards, HUM RTS. FIRST, https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/guantanamo-periodic-
review-boards (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). 
189. See Book, supra note 188, at 9. 
190. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, Guantanamo Detainee Profile, Mustafa Abd-al-Qawi Abd-al-
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review, meaning the quality of information should have improved.193  
Second, the vast majority of detainees fully participated in these hearings 
alongside their PRs, translators, and often private counsel as well.194  While 
this was permitted in past processes like the ARB, detainees did not in fact 
participate, so it was clearly not encouraged in the same way as it was for 
the PRBs.195  The in-person hearing gave detainees an opportunity to 
interact with the Board members and answer any questions posed to them.  
The detainees also met regularly with their representatives before hearings 
in order to be prepared.196  One must acknowledge that the passage of time, 
the aging of the detainees, and other factors may also have decreased the 
perceived threat level of the detainees in the interim years.  However, this 
does not explain the fact that initial decisions by the PRB were overturned 
by the same PRB within months and it certainly does not explain such 
occurrences as the acknowledgment of mistaken identities.197 
 In addition to the formal differences, these differences also appear to 
confirm the efficacy—if not the legitimacy—of the PRB process.  The PRB 
appears to approach each case in a more objective way, without a pre-
determined outcome in mind.198  While this may be the result of positive 
political pressure, this author argues that the process itself is more 
independent and impartial than previous processes.  The fact that the Board 
overturned itself on multiple cases—without interference by principals or 
other political actors—speaks to a high degree of de facto independence.  
Also, the active (voluntary) participation of most detainees between 2013–
16 suggests that the process was perceived to be more impartial than 
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previous processes.199  The current attitude is unclear as most detainees are 
not entitled to a full, in-person review for several years, and the de facto 
stop of all transfers out of Guantanamo will certainly affect the perception 
of the PRB as an independent and impartial process going forward.200 
 However, the lack of any protection from self-incrimination for 
detainees is more likely to derail the PRBs at this stage.  While it is 
unsettled whether detainees may raise a Fifth Amendment claim against 
self-incrimination in the context of Guantanamo, and particularly outside of 
any criminal process, there is a built-in conflict in the PRB system, which 
encourages detainees to “come clean” and demonstrate why they have 
changed, but which does not ensure that any statements made will not be 
used against them in later proceedings, whether criminal or civil in 
nature.201 When there is a political will to transfer detainees, detainees and 
their representatives may take the risk to participate in the process.  
Nonetheless, when transfers cease, detainees will likely determine that the 
honest admission of past history, encouraged by the Board, are not worth 
imperiling their habeas cases or other future processes if transfer is 
unlikely. 
 The early success of this process suggests that PRBs should be 
continued if they can be sufficiently revised by the Trump administration to 
better institutionalize independence and impartiality within the system.  
However, even if PRBs were to be improved, they were only ever intended 
for the rather small population at Guantanamo, and their complex structure 
requiring cabinet-level involvement may be unworkable in a more 
traditional battlefield context.202 
IV. THE FUTURE OF REVIEW PROCESSES IN GUANTANAMO AND BEYOND 
 As referenced in the introduction to this paper, detention may be 
necessary during armed conflict, but a deprivation of liberty may also have 
disastrous humanitarian or economic consequences for the individual and 
the individual’s family or community.203  There are times when a person 
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must be detained—specifically when it is militarily necessary to protect 
against an imperative threat to security.204   
 The overarching need for an independent judicial review to prevent 
detention from becoming arbitrary is well established in international law 
and jurisprudence.205  However, while this right is essential, there are 
several reasons why independent and impartial periodic reviews remain 
equally necessary during armed conflict.  For one, judicial review may not 
be readily available in the heat of battle or in far-off military bases on 
hostile terrain.  This should not exclude the possibility of judicial review, 
but it reinforces the necessity of appropriate, administrative reviews on a 
regular basis.  In addition, a judicial challenge to detention will almost 
always be a long, drawn-out court proceeding, which must be initiated by 
the detainee and is in most cases viewed as a one-off challenge.206  Periodic 
reviews, on the other hand, when implemented correctly, should provide an 
automatic and efficient procedure for regularly challenging the necessity of 
detention. 
 So, what does this mean for PRBs in Guantanamo or other NIAC 
review processes going forward?  In this author’s view it means two things.  
First, under international law, some kind of periodic review should be 
required for any (non-POW) law-of-war detention in keeping with the spirit 
and purpose of IHL.  However, because the exact composition and 
procedures of these boards are not well established in NIAC, it leaves wide 
discretion to states to analogize to IAC rules, IHRL procedures, and other 
sources.  Second, while reviews are not required as a matter of United 
States domestic law, long-standing and consistent United States practice 
establishes that reviews are both necessary and practical tools to deal with 
NIAC detention populations.207 
 The processes between the current PRB system and the system 
provided by GC IV for civilian internees are fairly similar.  Both establish 
administrative boards of multiple members and provide reviews every six 
months.208  Like GC IV, PRBs are determining whether a person poses an 
imperative threat to security, although PRBs use the term “significant” 
threat.209   
 However, there are still issues where PRBs do not keep up to date with 
GC IV reviews or other procedural guarantees required by IHL.  One key 
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question is whether the PRBs provide “the necessary guarantees of 
independence and impartiality” as required by GC IV.  For example, the 
fact that the composition of the PRBs may include members of the military 
seems to be in line with the composition of boards contemplated in both GC 
III and GC IV, but generally such individuals raise questions with respect to 
independence, as members of the military are not sufficiently independent 
within their chain of command.210  Likewise, the fact that the Personal 
Representative (PR) is working directly for the government agency that is 
also running the reviews is problematic, as it would seem to question their 
ability to be truly independent of their superior officers, although in practice 
this has not seemed to affect the ability of detainees to get positive 
decisions.  The most troubling factor may be that the Board does not have 
the final say for deciding continued detention—due to the oversight of the 
Review Committee—which suggests that the Board is not truly 
independent.211  Because the Review Committee is comprised of political 
appointees, the entire process is politicized.212  It is encouraging that in 
practice the Review Committee appears to have rarely exercised this power, 
but it does imbue the process with a lack of independence.  
 Impartiality is perhaps a more difficult element to assess in the case of 
PRBs, as the identity of the Board members is generally not common 
knowledge; thus, it is not clear whether any of the individual board 
members harbor particular opinions that might put their impartiality into 
question.  As impartiality is often viewed as a subjective test, one could 
imagine that members of the military and intelligence agencies—the 
entities responsible for the detention in the first place—do not appear 
impartial to the detainees.  However, the fact that the Board has overturned 
its own decisions would indicate that the cases are reviewed without a pre-
determined outcome in mind, which is a positive signal.213  In order to 
firmly exclude the possibility of discrimination or other biases, it would be 
helpful if the impartiality of the board members could be better 
institutionalized, perhaps by making their identities more public. 
 Finally, self-incrimination is also an issue.  Generally, the Fifth 
Amendment is only relevant with respect to criminal proceedings, but there 
is a possibility that even detainees cleared by a PRB might one day face 
criminal proceedings in a another country, even if the United States chooses 
not to prosecute them.214  As discussed in Part II, this issue is not clear 
under United States law, especially in such a complex legal setting as NIAC 
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detention, but there would seem to be some practical if not legal solutions 
to this problem.215  First, the Board could treat the process more like a 
parole board by assuming all accusations against the detainee may be true, 
but looking only at the future, not the past.  This could be reflected in the 
types of questions the Board asks and the informal criteria it uses internally 
to determine the threat-level.  It is clear from current practice that the Board 
spends an undue amount of attention on getting the detainee to “confess his 
crimes” or to express remorse for the past.216 
 A more formal solution would be to offer testimonial immunity to 
detainees for any statements made during the PRBs.  This novel approach 
would serve to allay the fears of detainees (and their lawyers) and 
encourage a more robust participation going forward. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The initiation of the PRBs—in spite of their shortcomings—provided 
detainees with a useful objective and served to reduce tensions within the 
detention facility as detainees focus on achieving a positive result of 
transfer or release.  While this is not a legal reason for maintaining review 
processes, it reflects the benefits of providing certainty and predictability of 
the detainee’s legal status.  By receiving regular feedback on their situation, 
detainees are provided not only with an outlet to voice their frustrations but 
are also given some insight into the reasons they are perceived as a threat.  
Furthermore, detainees are often given direct recommendations on how to 
change their behavior to mitigate this perceived threat.217   
 What the PRBs may lack in compliance with international legal norms, 
they make up for in terms of effectiveness and detainee participation.  
Moreover, many of the procedural flaws could be addressed to make way 
for improved PRBs and improved review processes in other future contexts.  
While the process may need to be tweaked for future detainees, particularly 
if security detention takes place extraterritorially and closer to the 
battlefield, the PRB provides an excellent framework on which to build a 
review process fully compliant with international norms. 
 The United States spent enormous resources developing detention 
review processes in Guantanamo—arguably in order to remain compliant 
with its obligations under international law—and at least as a matter of 
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positive policy.218  While none of the review processes have been perfect, 
the PRBs represent the best model thus far.  This is not only due to 
compliance with international norms, but also because it provides the 
detainees with some feedback as to the status of their continued detention, 
and requires the authorities to thoroughly consider the necessity of 
continuing to detain a specific individual.219  While the United States may 
not consider that these detainees are entitled to such an individual 
determination due to their status as “unprivileged enemy belligerents,” as a 
matter of policy, the United States should provide independent and 
impartial review processes to ensure that it is not detaining persons without 
the military necessity to do so.   
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